{"id":208,"date":"2026-07-23T16:38:33","date_gmt":"2026-07-23T16:38:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/summitrelocationtimess.com\/?p=208"},"modified":"2026-07-23T16:38:33","modified_gmt":"2026-07-23T16:38:33","slug":"what-amazon-organizers-can-learn-from-the-fight-for-15","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/summitrelocationtimess.com\/?p=208","title":{"rendered":"What Amazon Organizers Can Learn From the Fight for 15"},"content":{"rendered":"
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In These Times<\/em> is proud to be independent, pro-labor and anti-fascist. Support our work today and help left-wing journalism\u00a0thrive.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Read more Julio Foolio, Unions and \u201cSweat Equity\u201d<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2014\u2009\u2014\u2009\u2014<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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If the labor movement is to maintain and raise standards, then we must organize Amazon\u2009\u2014\u2009one of the largest employers and most powerful corporations in the U.S.\u00a0today.<\/p>\n

Already thousands of Amazon workers have engaged in organizing campaigns in dozens of delivery stations, fulfillment centers, and air hubs. Although Amazon has responded by raising its starting wage to around $21<\/span>, so far workers have won only one big unionization election, at a\u00a0Staten Island warehouse, and as yet, no union\u00a0contracts.<\/p>\n

Some of these campaigns began as independent union drives; today they\u2019re supported mainly by the Teamsters. But now that Amazon\u2019s aggressive expansion into groceries, health care, entertainment, and Internet web services are threatening labor standards in those sectors, the UFCW, SEIU, and other unions are considering making a\u00a0serious commitment of resources to support a\u00a0broader Amazon\u00a0campaign.<\/p>\n

The prospect of a\u00a0better-resourced and more comprehensive campaign is an exciting development. While the efforts so far have made some inroads, winning against Amazon will require unions to spend tens of millions of dollars and sustain a\u00a0multi-year campaign.<\/p>\n

We believe there is much to be learned from the successes and shortcomings of another ambitious union campaign: SEIU\u2019s Fight for\u00a015<\/span>.<\/p>\n

Amazon organizers can learn from the Fight for 15<\/span>\u2019s success at building pressure through a\u00a0broad public campaign\u2009\u2014\u2009and from its failure to really build an organization of, by, and for workers. At Amazon, we need to succeed at\u00a0both
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What was\u00a0it?<\/strong><\/p>\n

For a\u00a0decade, SEIU waged a\u00a0national campaign that raised wages for millions of low-wage workers, dramatically improved many states\u2019 minimum wage laws, and led to innovative sectoral bargaining (with mixed results) in California and New York\u00a0City.<\/p>\n

SEIU locals in New York City began organizing fast food workers in 2012<\/span>, and grabbed national attention with a\u00a0one-day strike by 200<\/span> workers demanding \u201c$15<\/span> [an hour] and a\u00a0union.\u201d This was more than double the federal and state minimum wage, $7<\/span>.25<\/span>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The bold demand and strike inspired a\u00a0national Fight for 15<\/span>, backed by SEIU and allied unions. It spread to 58<\/span> cities in 2013<\/span> and more than 500<\/span> cities by 2015<\/span>, and gradually broadened its focus to include home care, airport, and retail\u00a0workers.<\/p>\n

Over the course of the campaign, thousands of low-waged workers, mostly women and mostly people of color, risked their livelihoods and went on strike. As at Amazon, these were usually non-majority strikes. Still, in April 2015<\/span> alone, organizers claimed, 60<\/span>,000<\/span> workers took part in demonstrations across the U.S.<\/p>\n

The objective wasn\u2019t to organize store by store\u2009\u2014\u2009there were 200<\/span>,000<\/span> fast food outlets in the U.S., mostly owned by franchisees\u2009\u2014\u2009but to raise the federal minimum wage to $15<\/span>, improve working conditions, and build public and regulatory pressure on the major fast food employers that could eventually be leveraged to demand union recognition and collective\u00a0bargaining.<\/p>\n

Was it a\u00a0success?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The campaign won $70<\/span> billion in raises for 24<\/span> million workers across the country, plus other improvements like paid sick days. Seventeen states raised their minimum wages to at least $15<\/span>.<\/p>\n

SEIU pushed for joint-employer rules to force the big fast food companies, rather than just their franchisees, to bargain with workers and answer for violating their rights. And it won the utilization of a\u00a0previously untapped regulatory body, the .<\/p>\n

The movement helped link minimum wage demands with the civil rights issues of the Black Lives Matter movement, the call for immigration reform, and the insistence on equal pay for women, especially women of color. It trained a\u00a0national spotlight on income inequality and inspired new worker-led organizing at Starbucks and\u00a0Amazon.<\/p>\n

Often overlooked is the campaign\u2019s impact on union members. Hundreds of thousands of them were also making less than $15<\/span>. SEIU\u2019s campaign raised members\u2019 expectations and put tremendous pressure on its local affiliates (and many other unions) to get their contracts above this floor. For instance, at SEIU Local 888<\/span>\u00a0in Massachusetts, where one of the authors was on staff, several thousand members were below $15<\/span>, and the Fight for 15<\/span> inspired many of them to demand\u00a0more.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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However, critics (including us) have pointed out that the campaign did not result in new members or a\u00a0self-sustaining organization of fast food workers. While the slogan was \u201c$15<\/span> and a\u00a0union,\u201d the union part often seemed secondary. The campaign focused almost entirely on directly pressuring employers and winning better\u00a0legislation.<\/p>\n

Our late friend Jane McAlevey argued that the campaign was too focused on mobilizing and advocacy, rather than deep organizing. It relied on finding a\u00a0few worker representatives in each area to speak to the media and in front of legislators, instead of trying to organize\u00a0majorities.<\/p>\n

Lessons for\u00a0Amazon<\/strong><\/p>\n

Amazon is a\u00a0different type of target, more susceptible to disruptive worker action than the fast food industry. We have argued for a\u00a0metro strategy, where unions work together in big cities like New York and Los Angeles, where there are sympathetic elected officials and huge markets to\u00a0disrupt.<\/p>\n

Amazon organizing is also starting in a\u00a0different place than fast food organizing. There are dozens of serious, well-rooted organizing committees in its facilities across the country, and many have already taken collective\u00a0action.<\/p>\n

Read more Nowhere to Go: Inside the Texas Boarding Home System Where Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation are Widespread<\/a><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the Fight for 15<\/span> gave a\u00a0glimpse of what is possible when a\u00a0union devotes significant resources and staff to a\u00a0broad campaign.<\/p>\n

For instance, labor needs to up its capacity to research Amazon\u2019s chokepoints and vulnerabilities. It needs a\u00a0coordinating hub that uses collaborative methods to distribute relevant data and reports to networks of university research and labor centers. It also needs a\u00a0comprehensive digital capacity that spotlights worker actions and inspires broad support with sophisticated advertising and social\u00a0media.<\/p>\n

SEIU spent between $70<\/span> million and $180<\/span> million on the Fight for 15<\/span>. The only other recent organizing campaign that came close to this scale was UFCW\u2019s Our Walmart, which became a\u00a0public relations irritant to the company, but never posed a\u00a0strategic challenge to Walmart\u2019s power or business\u00a0model.<\/p>\n

The size and scope of the Fight for 15<\/span> was impressive. It\u00a0had:<\/p>\n